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In the News |
| Recap of the IFREE-sponsored Seventeenth Graduate Student Workshop in Experimental Economics at ESI, January 8-12, 2012. |
| Overview of the Winter/Spring 2012 Speakers - IFREE-Sponsored Lecture Series at ESI |
| The IFREE Small Grants Proposal: Read about the research projects awarded funding in October 2011. |
| IFREE Sponsored UAA Incoming Student Experimental Economics Workshop, August 25-26 2011. |
| Peter DeScioli and Bart Wilson acknowledge IFREE funding for paper about property published in Evolution and Human Behavior. |
| Pictures of the IFREE-Sponsored Summer Scholars Program, June 27th to August 6th 2011. |
| Pictures of the Vernon L. Smith IFREE-sponsored High School Workshops in Experimental Economics, July 25-29 and August 1-5 2011. |
| Recap of IFREE Sponsored "Economics in the Metaverse" High School Workshop at GMU, July 25th-29th 2011. |
| Breakthrough in the Second Phase of IFREE Supported Research on Combinatorial Auction. |
| Read Past News |
In 2002, IFREE-founder Dr. Vernon Smith was awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics for "having established laboratory experiments as a tool in empirical economic analysis, especially in the study of alternative market mechanisms."
IFREE-Sponsored Lecture Series at ESI
Brian Roberson, Ph.D.
Feb. 10th, 2012
Dynamic Special Interest Politics with Relational Contracts
Bio:
Brian Roberson is an Assistant Professor of Economics in the Krannert School of Management at Purdue University. His research focuses on the strategic allocation of resources in environments in which the outcome of a given conflict is determined by the performance in multiple component conflicts and examines how—in applications from the economic, information, military, and political sciences—behavior depends on the structural linkages between the individual contests.
Abstract:
This paper explores a model of special interest politics that allows for agreements among long-lived interest groups, political parties, and bureaucrats to be supported by informal relational contracts. Special interests and political parties may form agreements involving the exchange of campaign contributions in return for influence over agency actions, but, as agreements are non-binding, there is a temptation for the winning party to renege after each election. We characterize a relevant refinement of the efficient sequential equilibria. We find that political parties and special interests are able to form stable alliances that generate influence over agency decisions—agencies that acquiesce to the demands of political allies are rewarded in the agency funding process and shirking ones are punished. Furthermore, the political parties have incentive to form a system of advisory committees that are positioned to monitor the agencies and can be sold to the allied special interests.
Visit the ESI website for more speaker information, links to papers and videos of past lectures.
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